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Abstract: 
Airborne gamma ray spectrometry using high volume scintillation detectors, optionally in 
conjunction with Ge detectors, has potential for making rapid environmental measurements in 
response to nuclear accidents. A literature search on past nuclear accidents has been conducted 
to define the source terms which have been experienced so far. Selected gamma ray spectra 
recorded after past accidents have also been collated to examine the complexity of observed 
behaviour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results of this work will be used in the formulation of Government policy, but views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent 
Government policy. 
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SUMMARY 
 
Airborne Gamma Spectrometry (AGS) has developed considerably since the Chernobyl 
accident, and is more widely recognised as having an important contribution to make to 
nuclear emergency response. The abilities to survey large areas rapidly with high sampling 
densities, and to produce radiometric maps on emergency timescales have already been 
demonstrated. However the ability of AGS systems to resolve a complex gamma ray spectrum, 
particularly in the early phases of a reactor accident is less well defined. This report reviews 
past experience of nuclear accidents, and the gamma ray spectra recorded immediately 
afterwards, particularly from the air, in preparation for an experimental and theoretical study 
of the AGS response to a fission product source.                                                 
 
A literature survey of past nuclear accidents has been conducted, and used to prepare a list of 
accidents with off-site consequences. The accidents reviewed have occurred at a mean  rate of 
3 per year, since 1945. Accidents involving core damage have occurred every 2 to 3 years,  
with destruction of the core every 6 to 7 years. About 20% of the accidents resulted in some 
off-site contamination, with a further 10% resulting in contamination of the building. There 
were four accidents resulting in the release of over 10
15
 Bq, and one in which over 10
18
 Bq was 
released. Source terms for selected accidents; an explosion at a reprocessing plant in 
Chelyabinsk, the fire at Windscale, the crash of the Soviet satellite Cosmos-954, an explosion 
on a Soviet submarine during refuelling and the Chernobyl accident; are discussed.  
 
Details of some of the gamma-ray surveys conducted after nuclear accidents are given, with 
particular emphasis on airborne surveys. A selection of γ-ray spectra from some of these 
surveys is presented. The influence of accident conditions, and post accident delays, on source 
term and spectral simplification has been noted. This information will be used, together with 
the results of experimental work in progress to evaluate data analysis strategies for high 
volume sodium iodide (NaI) spectrometers in the early stages of emergency response, and to 
examine the need for high resolution detectors. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This report sets out interim findings of a study carried out for the Department of the 
Environment (DOE) to investigate the capability of Airborne Gamma Spectrometry (AGS) 
systems in measuring the quantities of short-lived fission products arising from nuclear and 
other radiological accidents.  The aspects of the study that are reported here are the numbers 
and kinds of accidents that have occurred in the past, and the nature of the contamination, and 
hence measurement spectra, that they have given rise to.  This information will in turn be used 
in subsequent parts of the study, along with other data, to help evaluate the capability of AGS 
systems in measuring post-accident contamination levels. 
 
The report presents a brief introduction to the fission process and products, followed by 
identification of source terms from past nuclear accidents. Factors which influence the release 
of radionuclides are noted, and examples of the types of γ-ray spectra observed are shown. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Nuclear Fission 
 
Nuclear fission is the process whereby heavy nuclei, typically actinides, split into two lighter 
nuclei, with an accompanying release of energy. For several nuclei fission follows the capture 
of a thermal neutron; such nuclei are said to be fissile. Nuclear reactors operate on a chain 
reaction in which a fissile nucleus (usually 
235
U) absorbs a thermal neutron (ie neutrons which 
are in thermal equilibrium with the reactor, with energies of about 0.03eV) which induces 
fission. The fission releases energy and a number of fast neutrons, these neutrons are then 
moderated, slowing them down to thermal energies. If, on average, one of these neutrons is 
absorbed by another fissile nucleus resulting in fission then a self-sustaining chain reaction 
occurs, and the reactor is said to be critical. If, on average, more than one neutron is absorbed 
by a fissile nucleus then the reactor is said to be super-critical, if less than one neutron is 
absorbed the reactor is sub-critical. 
 
Following fission a broad range of products is formed with masses mostly in the range from 
60-170 amu; the yield of any one isotope being at most a few percent. Most of the nuclei 
formed are unstable, having an excess of neutrons, and decay by β-emission (with half lives 
ranging from milliseconds to several years), or very occasionally by neutron emission (with 
half-lives of less than a few seconds). Fission of 
235
U induced by thermal neutrons forms about 
250 different isotopes directly with independent yields in excess of 0.01%. Other isotopes are 
formed by the decay of these, usually by β-decay which results in isobaric decay chains where 
all the isotopes have the same mass. A typical β-decay chain is the decay of 131In through 
several other isotopes, some of which are also formed directly in the fission process, to 
eventually form 
131
Xe which is stable: 
 
   Fission yield(%):         0.034       0.034           1.38             0.15             0.0019      2.8x10-7 
131
In  
131
Sn  
131
Sb  
131
Te  
131
I  
131
Xe 
     Half life:                    270ms      39.0s           23.0m          25.0m           8.4d 
 
This decay chain is significant because the radioactive isotopes of iodine are radiologically 
important, since if released into the environment they collect in the thyroid, resulting in an 
increased risk from thyroid cancers. Although the independent fission yield of 
131
I is very low, 
substantial quantities will be present in a reactor because of the higher yields for parent 
isotopes, 1.6% of fissions will produce 
131
I. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the mass distribution of fission fragments following thermal neutron induced 
fission of 
235
U. The longer lived isotopes in the decay chains that are strongly populated 
(masses 88-103 and 132-144 have yields in excess of 3%) will be fairly common in the 
reactor, even if their independent fission yields are quite low. There are 187 isotopes formed 
with cumulative yields in excess of 1%, of which 82 have yields in excess of 5%. Of these 34 
isotopes are stable, 8 have half lives in excess of 1000 years, 10 have half lives between 1 
month and 1000 years, 11 have half lives between 1 day and 1 month, and 19 have half lives 
between 1 hour and 1 day, the remainder have half lives of less than 1 hour. Thus, despite the 
large number of isotopes produced by nuclear fission, relatively few will present any major 
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long term radiological hazard. 
 
The radioisotope inventory of a nuclear reactor consists of a complex cocktail of fuel material, 
fission products, decay products and activation products caused by the capture of neutrons by 
other material in the reactor (fuel cladding, moderators, structural materials etc.). The 
composition of this inventory will change over time as fission products are produced, and then 
decay or absorb neutrons. Radionuclides with a short half-life will rapidly reach an equilibrium 
in the reactor, radionuclides with longer half-lives will continue to build up during reactor 
operation.  
 
In the event of an accident the composition of the radionuclides released will depend upon the 
current radioisotope inventory of the reactor and the type and severity of the accident. These 
radionuclides may then be dispersed by atmospheric conditions and be deposited downwind 
of the accident. The distribution and radioisotope inventory of the resulting fallout will depend 
upon weather patterns and the time since the accident. Over time the radioisotope inventory 
of the fallout will change as a result of the nuclear decay of the radioisotopes, and within any 
part of the environment by various other processes that remove isotopes (for example being 
washed out by rain). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The mass distribution of fission fragments following fission of 235U induced by 
thermal neutrons. 
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3. SOURCE TERMS 
 
There are many potential accident types which might involve release of radioactive or nuclear 
material to the environment. The source terms for such events in this study are taken to be a 
description of the quantities and types of radionuclides, together with their physical/chemical 
form and mode of release. 
 
3.1 Types of accident 
 
There are many possible causes of nuclear accidents, including design faults, operator error, 
inappropriate operating procedures or damage to equipment. Some of the most common causes 
of damage to a reactor are loss of coolant, or reduction in coolant flow, and sudden changes  
in activity. Often, particularly in severe accidents, more than one cause contributed to the 
accident. Some of these causes are detailed in Appendix A. 
 
Source terms calculated by Westinghouse for PWR reactors using the WASH1400 code (ref: 
USNRC 1975), and used in risk assessment for the Sizewell B PWR, are divided into four 
broad categories: 
Release A: accidents of the severest type, the containment fails at the moment when the core 
becomes completely molten. A substantial amount of highly active radionuclides will then be 
released into the environment. 
Release B: accidents where containment fails some hours after the core melts, there will be a 
substantial release of radionuclides although radioactive decay would have reduced the activity, 
and aerosol sedimentation would result in some retention. 
Release C: accidents in which containment fails below ground level, but there is no substantial 
leak above ground. 
Release D: accidents in which the containment does not fail, but a small release of activity may 
result at the design-rate. 
 
Among the other, non-reactor, accidents that have occurred there have been accidents at other 
parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, including explosions at reprocessing, waste storage or fuel 
fabrication plants as a result of chemical or nuclear processes. Other accidents have involved 
the break-up of radioactive sources, for example from hospital equipment or nuclear weapons, 
in some cases with fragments being dispersed among the general population. There have also 
been accidents involving the re-entry of satellites containing radioactive materials. The nature 
of the accident determines both the magnitude of the source term and its isotopic composition. 
 
3.2 Overview of past accidents 
 
A search of available literature produced information on approximately 150 nuclear accidents, 
of which 38 resulted in off-site releases. These are listed in table 3.1, with a brief description 
of the incident and the consequences. The other incidents identified in the current work are 
given in Appendix B. Of these many were relatively minor, resulting in the release of no 
radioactivity or even damage to the core, but could have had more serious consequences. Some 
of the other accidents resulted in serious damage to the core, yet released little or no   
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radioactivity. Figure 3.1 shows various classes of incident divided into five year periods, with 
the classes being: the total number of incidents, the  number  of  major  incidents (ie:  those  
involving  radioactive  releases, core damage, death or serious injury), the number of incidents 
in which only the buildings were contaminated, the number of accidents involving a release 
off-site, and the number of accidents involving a major release of radioactive material (ie: 
greater than 10
15 
Bq). The number of major incidents includes the incidents in the other 
categories. 
 
From figure 3.1 it can be seen that nuclear accidents have occurred at the rate of  
approximately 3 per year. The accidents resulted in core damage in 20 cases and the 
destruction of the reactor in a further 8. Historically there have been accidents that damage the 
core, on average, every 2 to 3 years, and accidents in which the core is destroyed every 6 to  
7 years. Of the accidents listed  38 (about 20%) resulted in some radioactive material being 
released to the environment, of which 4 released in excess of 10
15
 Bq and one over 10
18
 Bq, 
and a further 25 (about 10%) resulted in contamination of the building. On average there have 
been accidents at nuclear facilities resulting in a release of radioactive material every 2 years, 
with a significant release (in excess of 10
15
 Bq) once every decade.  
 
It can be seen from figure 3.1 that there was an initial rapid increase in the number of reported 
incidents, corresponding to the increasing number of nuclear facilities. The rate of accidents 
then levelled off in the sixties and early seventies and is now declining slightly. However, the 
number of accidents involving off-site releases has remained approximately constant over this 
period. It is to be hoped that increases in knowledge, experience and public awareness will 
result in a reduction in the rates of accidents in the future, however past experience indicates  
a continuing need to be prepared to deal with an off-site release of radioactive material. 
 
The more severe accidents at Chelyabinsk, Windscale and Chernobyl, the explosion while 
refuelling a submarine at Chazhma Cove and the crash of the satellite Cosmos-954, will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following section. 
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Date Facility Description of incident Refs. 
1951 Detroit, USA 
research reactor 
Fissionable material overheated. The air was contaminated with 
radioactive gases. 
Medvedev 1989 
29/9/57 Chelyabinsk (Kyshtym) 
reprocessing plant, 
Southern Urals, USSR 
A chemical explosion in concrete tanks holding highly active wastes 
released 7x1016 Bq of fission product to the environment. See section 
3.1.3 for further details. 
see section 3.3 
10/10/57 Windscale graphite pile, 
UK 
A fire released 1015 Bq of radioactive material into the atmosphere. See 
section 3.1.3  
see section 3.3 
26/7/59 Sodium Reactor 
Experiment, Santa 
Susanna, California 
Sealant leaked into the cooling system, coating the fuel elements, and 
hence reducing the effectiveness of the coolant. The fuel elements 
overheated, and 10, out of 43, fuel assemblies were badly damaged. 
Some radioactivity was released from the stack. 
IAEA 1994 
Bertini et al 1980 
Thompson and 
  Beckerley 1964 
McDonald and 
  DeVan 1960 
3/4/60 Westinghouse Testing 
Reactor, Pennsylvania, 
USA 
Coolant flow was blocked by a piece of cladding from a fuel element. 
One element melted, and some radioactivity was released into the 
atmosphere. 
IAEA 1994 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Thompson and 
  Beckerley 1964 
Korsmeyer 1960 
3/1/61 SL-1, Idaho, USA 
experimental power 
reactor 
A power surge, following the manual removal of a control rod,  
resulted in a pressure wave which lifted the pressure vessel 3m. Three 
people were killed by radiation and flying debris. The pressure vessel 
was distorted by the blast, about 10% of the fission products escaped 
from the pressure vessel, 0.01% from building. A further 23 people 
received significant radiation doses during the clean-up. 
IAEA 1994 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Stratton 1967 
Thompson and 
  Beckerley 1964 
Cottrell 1961, 1962 
Buchanan 1963a 
25/1/61 Reprocessing plant, 
Idaho, USA 
After a release of compressed gas enriched U solution entered the 
evaporator. The area was highly contaminated. 
Puit 1996 
1962 Mexico Four members of one family (including a child) died after contact with 
a 2x1011 Bq 60Co source. 
Pasquier 1996 
1966 Palomares, Spain An American B-52 bomber exploded, dropping its bombs which broke 
on impact. Pu was spread over 255 hectares. 
Brown et. al.1996 
1967 Lake Karachai, 
Kyshtym, USSR 
After 1956 waste from the Kyshtym plant was dumped in Lake 
Karachai. As a result of a drought the lake dried out, and 
approximately 22x1012Bq of 137Cs and 90Sr was distributed as dust. 
Brown et. al.1996 
7/11/67 SILOE, France 
research reactor 
During overpower testing a fuel element partially melted. 2x1015 Bq 
of fission products were released to the reactor pool, 7x1013 Bq of 
noble gases were released through the stack 
IAEA 1994 
1968  Thule, Greenland An American bomber dropped its bombs, which split open on impact. Brown et. al.1996 
19/11/71 Monticello waste 
storage facility, 
Minnesota, USA 
A tank overflow released 200 000 litres of contaminated water into the 
Mississippi. 
Medvedev 1989 
7/1/74 Leningrad NPP, USSR An explosion of a reinforced concrete holder for radioactive gases. Medvedev 1989 
6/2/74 Leningrad NPP, USSR An intermediate loop ruptured due to the boiling of water. Highly 
radioactive water was discharged into the environment. 
Medvedev 1989 
10/75 Leningrad NPP, USSR Partial destruction of the core (local melt). About 5.5x1016 Bq of 
radionuclides were released through the ventilation stack. 
Medvedev 1989 
10/5/77 Dounreay An explosion in a water filled shaft containing assorted highly active 
material, including fuel elements, occurred as a result of sodium-water 
reactions. Approximately 50 hot particles were recovered from the 
foreshore, outside the perimeter fence. 
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13/12/77 Millstone-1 NPP, 
Connecticut, USA 
Two explosions of hydrogen gas occurred in the off-gas stack 
building. One man was injured, and a small amount of radioactive 
contamination occurred. 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Casto et. al.1978 
1978 Sétif, Algeria One person died, and 5 more seriously injured (including 2 children) 
after a 6x1011 Bq Ir source was lost. 
Pasquier 1996 
24/1/78 Cosmos 954 satellite, 
Canada 
A Soviet satellite crashed over northern Canada, the nuclear core was 
spread over a large area. See section 3.1.3. 
see section 3.3 
17/10/78 Reprocessing plant, 
Idaho, USA 
U accumulated in a column as a result of an undetected flow of 
material. The area was highly contaminated. 
Puit 1996 
28/3/79 Three Mile Island NPP, 
Pennsylvania, USA 
A pump in the turbine building stopped, which caused pumps 
downstream and the turbines to stop. The reactor scrammed. As a  
result of valves incorrectly left closed no water was supplied to the 
steam generators, which increased the temperature and pressure in the 
primary system. The pressure release valve opened, but failed to close, 
and primary water began to fill the drain tank. A faulty meter caused 
the operator to shut off water flow to the primary system, allowing a 
bubble of steam and hydrogen to form uncovering the top of the core, 
which partially melted. About 6x1011 Bq of 131I, 1.6x1015 Bq of 85Kr 
and other noble gases were released into the atmosphere, and liquid 
radioactive wastes discharged into the Susquehanna River. Most of the 
release occurred while eliminating the hydrogen bubble. 
Hull 1988, 1989 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Casto and Cottrell 
  1979 
NSAC 1979 
7/8/79 Irving fuel fabrication 
plant, Tennessee 
A discharge of highly enriched uranium. Medvedev 1989 
6/1/81 Reprocessing plant, La 
Hague 
A fire in a storage silo released 4x1011Bq into the atmosphere, which 
was deposited close to the accident, with surface contamination 
reaching 11MBqm-2. Five people received a significant external dose, 
and a further 35 slightly exposed. 
Joly 1996 
25/1/82 R.E.Ginna NPP, 
Rochester, New York 
A broken tube in a steam generator resulted in the release of  
radioactive steam into the atmosphere. 
Medvedev 1989 
30/1/82 Ontario NPP, New York A breakdown in the cooling system caused a leak of radioactive 
substances into the atmosphere. 
Medvedev 1989 
9/82 Chernobyl NPP, USSR The central fuel assembly of No.1 reactor was destroyed due to 
operator error. Radioactive material was released into the local area. 
Medvedev 1989 
1983 Ciudad Juarez, Mexico 4000 people were exposed after the dispersion of 6000 60Co particles 
from a 2x1013 Bq source scrapped without precautions. 
Pasquier 1996 
Brown et. al.1996 
1984 Casablanca A family was irradiated by a 1012 Bq Ir source collected by the father. Pasquier 1996 
19/5/85 Indian Point NPP, New 
York 
The failure of a valve led to the discharge of several hundred gallons 
of radioactive water, some of which entered the environment beyond 
the facility. 
Medvedev 1989 
10/8/85 Nuclear submarine at 
Chazhma Cove, USSR 
A spontaneous reaction during refuelling resulted in the destruction of 
the reloading house, damage to the submarine and the release of at  
least 1012 Bq of radioactive material. See section 3.1.3. 
see section 3.3 
26/4/86 Chernobyl NPP, USSR A major accident released 3x1018 Bq of radioactive material into the 
atmosphere. See section 3.1.3 for more details. 
see section 3.3 
2/12/86 SILOE, Grenoble, 
France 
research reactor 
The bottom of the pool was found to have degraded allowing water to 
leak out. There was a slight tritium contamination of underground 
water. 
IAEA 1994 
1986 Webbers Falls, 
Oklahoma, USA 
An explosion of a tank containing radioactive gas at a uranium 
enrichment plant. One person was killed, eight injured. 
Medvedev 1989 
Sept 1987 Goiania, Brazil Four people were killed, 6 seriously injured and 250 contaminated 
when a 137Cs source was dismantled and sold as scrap. In order to help 
locate all the fragments an airborne survey using a helicopter at an 
altitude of 40m was conducted.  
Berreto & Fonseca  
 1988 
Pasquier 1996 
Brown et. al.1996 
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2/12/91 EWA, Poland A pressure container of Xe, used to produce 125I, burst. About 5x106 Bq 
of 125I was released to the environment. 
IAEA 1994 
24/3/92 Sosnovyy Bor NPP, 
Russia 
The accident resulted in the release of a small quantity of radioactive 
material, including small uranium fuel particles, that were detected in 
Finland. 
Toivonen et. 
al.1992 
6/4/93 Tomsk-7 reprocessing 
plant, Siberia 
The accident released about 2x1013 Bq of radioactive materials. About 
100 km2 was severely contaminated, with fission products being 
detected as far away as Alaska.  
Vakulovski et. 
al.1994 
Larsen et. al.1994 
 
Table 3.1: Accidents at nuclear facilities involving off-site releases. Further details of selected 
accidents are given in section 3.3, as indicated in the table. Details of other accidents, not 
involving off-site contamination, are given in Appendix B. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The distribution of nuclear incidents over five year periods. The plot shows the total 
number of incidents, the number of major incidents (including those in other categories in this plot), 
the number of accidents resulting in contamination of just the building, the number of accidents 
involving an off-site release and the number of accidents involving a major release. 
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3.3 Discussion of selected accidents 
 
Accident at Chelyabinsk, Southern Urals, USSR, September 29
th 
1957. 
 
The accident occurred at a military installation, located near the town of Kyshtym in the 
Chelyabinsk region of the former USSR, dedicated to producing plutonium for nuclear 
weapons, and is described in Nikipelov et. al. 1989, Romanov et. al. 1991 and Trabalka & 
Auerbach 1991. Waste from the plant was stored on a long-term basis in metal tanks encased 
in concrete, with the heat generated by radioactive decay dissipated by a water cooling system. 
In 1956, more than a year before the accident, corrosion and a failure of monitoring equipment 
led to a breakdown in the cooling system of a 300m
3
 tank. The design of the tank, and the high 
radiation field, prevented repair of the system. This allowed the 70-80 tonnes of liquid wastes 
stored there, mainly as nitrate and acetate compounds, to heat up and dry out. At 4.20 pm,  
local time, on the 29
th
 September 1957 the tank exploded with a force estimated as between 
70 and 100 tonnes of TNT, the explosion being the result of a reaction between the acetates 
and nitrates in the drying waste. 
 
The explosion ejected about 7x10
16
 Bq of radioactive fission products into the atmosphere to 
a height of approximately 1000m. The fall out from this cloud, which was blown in a north-
easterly direction contaminated parts of three provinces, with the plume depositing over 0.1 
Ci km
-2 
 (3.7x10
3
 Bq m
-2
) of 
90
Sr travelling some 300 km and covering an area in excess of 
15 000 km
2
. The area with deposition of 
90
Sr greater then 2 Ci km
-2
 (7.4x10
4
 Bq m
-2
) covered 
some 1000 km
2
 in a track 105 km long and 8-9 km wide, and a 120 km
2
 area with a population 
of some 2000 received a deposition of 
90
Sr in excess of 100 Ci km
-2
 (3.7x10
6
 Bq m
-2
). Figure 
3.2 shows the distribution of this fallout, where it clearly follows a gaussian-like plume except 
for a small bulge at the south west end which is due to a 1967 release from dried radioactive 
sediments blown off the beach of a lake by a tornado.  
 
Table 3.2 shows the composition of the radioactive material released. A noticeable feature of 
this composition is the small quantity of 
137
Cs present, this was a major component of the 
Windscale and Chernobyl releases, and has a half life of 30.2 years. This is the result of the 
method used to concentrate these wastes, which was by means of precipitation with NaOH. 
The resulting precipitate contained practically all the radionuclides except the Cs isotopes 
which remained dissolved in the alkaline solution and were later concentrated separately. The 
95
Zr-
95
Nb content, amounting to some 20-25% of the total, is also somewhat surprising in 
waste that has been recycled and stored for over a year since the half-lives of these nuclei are 
relatively short (64 and 35 days respectively). 
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Figure 3.2: Deposition pattern of 90Sr released from the Chelyabinsk plant. The contours are 
in units of Ci km
-2
 (1 Ci km
-2
 = 3.7 x 10
4
 Bq m
-2
). Taken from Trabalka & Auerbach 1991. 
 
 
 
 
Radionuclide 
 
Activity released (x10
15
 Bq) 
 
Nikipelov et. al.1989 
 
Burnazyan 1990 
 
89
Sr 
 
traces 
 
1.9 
 
90
Sr+
90
Y 
 
4.0 
 
5.2 
 
95
Zr+
95
Nb 
 
20 
 
16 
 
106
Ru+
106
Rh 
 
2.8 
 
2.6 
 
137
Cs 
 
0.03 
 
0.07 
 
144
Ce+
144
Pr 
 
48 
 
47 
 
remainder 
 
traces 
 
<9 
 
Table 3.2: The composition of the material released from the accident at Chelyabinsk, USSR, 
September 29
th
 1957. 
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Accident at Windscale, UK, October 10
th
 1957. 
 
The accident occurred in a graphite pile, used to produce plutonium for the British nuclear 
weapons programme, during a routine release of Wigner energy (energy stored in the graphite 
crystal lattice due to the displacement of carbon atoms by neutron bombardment), and is 
described in the official report (Atomic Energy Office 1957) and other sources including 
Arnold 1992. This was normally achieved by shutting down the pile, stopping the coolant flow 
and applying nuclear heating which raised the temperature of the pile sufficiently to anneal out 
the radiation damage, at which point the release was self-sustaining. The reactor was shut 
down at 7pm on the 7
th
 October for such a procedure, but the graphite temperature was thought 
to be dropping and so a second application of nuclear heating was initiated from 11am on the 
8
th
. With hindsight this second heating was unnecessary. Graphite temperatures continued to 
rise and air cooling was resumed at 10pm on the 9
th
 of October. By the following morning 
stack activity had increased and visual inspection revealed that uranium was red hot in the 
vicinity of a thermocouple channel. By that evening, despite discharging fuel, some 150 
channels were overheating. Attempts to cool the fire with carbon dioxide were unsuccessful, 
however it was subdued with water on the 11
th 
and cooled the following day. 
 
The fire released radioactive fission products totalling some 10
15
 Bq, excluding noble gases, 
through the 120m high stack. Wind initially carried the cloud of discharged materials towards 
the north-east beyond Penrith, later winds carried it south-easterly over Cumbria and 
Lancashire. Figure 3.3 shows the deposition of 
131
I in NW England following the accident. The 
cloud was eventually carried into Scandinavia and Northern Europe. The peak discharge rates 
occurred at approximately midnight on the 10
th
 and shortly afterwards, when the uranium was 
burning, and between 9 and 11am on the 11
th
, when water was first put on the fire and steam 
carried radioactive particles up the stack. 
 
The composition of the radionuclides released, taken from several sources, is given in table 
3.3. The values given by Clarke 1974 were derived from a computer inventory calculation  
with release factors of 0.1%, 1% or 10% for non-volatile, semi-volatile and volatile elements 
respectively. The inventory calculation required some assumptions about the reactor, such as 
the weight of the fuel, power rating and irradiation history, to be made since these were not 
given in the literature. The activities of daughter nuclides in equilibrium with their parents 
were assumed to be the same as the parents, and so were not given but have been included in 
table 3.3. The calculation included a three day cooling off period prior to the accident, during 
which the Wigner release took place. This resulted in the absence of very short lived 
radioisotopes in the release, with the exception of those in equilibrium with longer lived 
parents. The absence of 
133
I is, however, puzzling since with a half life of 20.8 hours and a 
cumulative fission yield of 6.7% this should still be fairly common in the reactor inventory 
after three days. The activity due to its daughter, 
133
Xe, is included, however.  The earlier 
values of the radionuclide release were based on various measurements made shortly after the 
accident.   
 
The various sources give some variety in the composition of the release, but they all agree 
within a factor of 10. The noble gases comprised some 67% of the release, a further 27% of 
the release was tritium. Of the remaining 6% of the release the largest components were 
131
I 
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and 
132
I, resulting from the decay of 
132
Te. The tritium released was produced by irradiating 
rods of lithium-magnesium alloy, for research and the development of hydrogen bombs. 
210
Po, 
used to initiate the explosive chain reaction in nuclear weapons, was produced in the reactor 
by the irradiation of bismuth oxide. 
 
It is notable that the estimated 
137
Cs release from Windscale, which depends mainly on the fuel 
age, varies in the published literature by a factor of 2, and that 
137
Cs to 
131
I ratios vary from 
about 3% to 7.7% depending on the source of the information used. This is of some interest, 
since the majority of environmental observations at the time of the accident referred to 
131
I, 
although the 
137
Cs output has been the subject of more recent interest following post-Chernobyl 
livestock movement restrictions in West Cumbria. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: The deposition of 131I in NW England following the Windscale fire, the activities 
are in μCi m-2 (1 μCi m-2 = 3.7 x 104 Bq m-2). Taken from Chamberlain 1959. 
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2.3 
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0.59 
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0.10 
 
 
 
0.10 
 
153
Sm 
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0.078 
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Eu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.26 
 
 
 
0.26 
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Po 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.8 
 
235
U 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.0x10
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U 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.0x10
-5
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Pu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.6x10
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Table 3.3: The composition of the activity released from the accident at Windscale, UK, 
October 10
th
 1957. The nuclei labelled 
*
 are short lived daughters in equilibrium with longer lived 
parents. 
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Crash of Cosmos-954, January 24
th
 1978. 
 
Cosmos-954, a nuclear powered Soviet satellite, re-entered the Earth's atmosphere and broke 
up over Canada's Northwest Territories. The resultant satellite fragments were spread along 
an east-west trajectory, covering an area approximately 800km long and 50km wide, although 
some minute particles were collected up to 400km south of this track as a result of dispersion 
by the wind. The radionuclides found included 
54
Mn, 
58
Co (activation products), 
95
Zr, 
95
Nb, 
103
Ru and 
140
La. The more volatile elements (eg: I and Cs) and noble gases burnt off during 
re-entry and so were no longer present in the fragments which reached earth. The accident is 
described in Bristow 1978 and Grasty 1980. 
 
Accident during submarine refuelling at Chazhma Cove, USSR, August 10
th
 1985. 
 
The accident occurred in a nuclear-powered submarine moored at a dockyard in Chazhma 
Cove for repairs, and is described in Sivintsev et. al. 1994. After the reactors were refuelled  
a spontaneous chain reaction occurred in the starboard reactor as a result of a violation of 
nuclear safety rules. In the resultant thermal explosion the bow and stern equipment 
compartments and the reloading house were destroyed (the roof of the reloading house was 
thrown 70-80m), the pressure hull in the stern part of the submarines' reactor bay was 
damaged, and fresh fuel was thrown out of the reactor. A fire in the reactor bay took four 
hours to contain. Particles of fuel, fission fragments and activation products, totalling 
approximately 10
13
 Bq, were precipitated around the submarine with a radius of 50-100m, with 
a surface density of (80-700)x10
6
 Bq m
-2
. 
 
Accident at Chernobyl, USSR, April 26
th
 1986. 
 
The accident occurred during an experimental test of the reactors' emergency systems, and is 
described in several sources including INSAG 1986, Gittus et. al. 1987 and Medvedev 1989. 
The experiment started at 1am on April 25
th
 by reducing power in the reactor by 50%, from 
3000 to 1500 MW(th), where it was held from 1pm. At 11pm power reduction was resumed 
towards a target of 700-1000 MW(th), but operator error led to the power reduction continuing 
to 30 MW(th). The reactor was stabilized at 200 MW(th) (below the minimum permissible 
power level of 700 MW(th)) at 1am on the 26
th
. At this power the reactor had a positive void 
coefficient, and several safety systems had been shut down and too many control rods 
removed. These mistakes left the reactor in a very unstable state, and when the experiment was 
initiated by tripping the turbine the only significant heat sink in the reactor was removed. The 
result was boiling of the coolant, resulting in an uncontrollable rise in reactivity reaching an 
estimated 100 times full power. This power excursion resulted in a substantial and sudden 
increase in pressure within the reactor, rupturing a number of fuel channels. The reactor space 
had been designed to withstand the rupture of a single fuel channel, and it now over-
pressurized and the upper plate weighing about 1000 tonnes was lifted. This ruptured all the 
remaining fuel channels, lifted the control rods and sheared pipes. A second explosion 
occurred 2 to 3 seconds later which destroyed the reactor building. Upon exposure to air the 
graphite moderator caught fire, and chunks of burning graphite and fuel material were thrown 
from the reactor building, starting secondary fires that threatened the other reactors on the site.  
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After heroic efforts by fire fighters these secondary fires were extinguished before any damage 
to the other reactors or their control systems could occur. The damage to the building allowed 
an air flow through the core to develop, fanning the fire there. The operators succeeded in 
injecting water into the reactor building, but most of it flowed out of the reactor towards units 
1 and 2, where it threatened to short circuit the control systems, and water flow was stopped 
after about half a day. The fire burnt for nine days, and was eventually extinguished by 
dumping about 5000 tonnes of various materials (mostly sand and clay, along with boron 
carbide and lead) into the reactor well from helicopters, and pumping nitrogen through the 
reactor to reduce the core temperature and starve the fire of oxygen. Approximately 135 tonnes 
of fuel (about 71% of the total fuel in the reactor) melted and flowed into the lower regions  
of the reactor where it eventually solidified into various kinds of lava-like materials. After 
initial clean-up operations, the remains of the reactor building were enclosed in a concrete and 
steel sarcophagus, the long term condition of which remains unclear. 
 
The accident resulted in the release of approximately 100% of the noble gases, 10-20% of the 
volatile radionuclides and 3-6% of the more refractory radionuclides present in the core, a total 
release of about 3x10
18
 Bq. About 25% of this release occurred on the first day of the 
accident, the rest was released over a period of nine days. Some 3-4% of the fuel in the core 
was also expelled from the reactor; 0.3-0.5% was deposited within the site, 1.5-2.0% was 
deposited within 20km of the site, and 1.0-1.5% was deposited beyond 20km of the site. 
About 50% of the released material was deposited within 30km of the reactor. The 
composition of the active material deposited close to the reactor was similar to that of whole 
fuel, enhanced in volatile fission products by a factor of 3-6. Samples collected in western 
Europe were composed almost entirely of volatile fission products, with only a few percent 
composed of less volatile products and fuel (possibly released as fine aerosols in the initial 
explosion). 
 
Initially the activity released was transported by the wind in a north-westerly direction over 
Scandinavia. A few days later the wind shifted, transporting the activity in a more westerly 
direction. A high pressure system that moved easterly across Europe resulted in a wide 
dispersal of the material. Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of 
137
Cs near Chernobyl, figure 3.5 
shows γ-dose rates in the European part of the former USSR. The pattern of deposition was 
very patchy, largely reflecting rainfall as the cloud passed. 
 
The composition of the radionuclide release is given in table 3.4. About 60% of this release 
was due to noble gases, indicating a much larger proportional release of other radionuclides 
than in the Windscale fire. Of the remaining 40% of the release the largest component was 
131
I, 
as in the Windscale fire, but the proportion of less volatile radionuclides was much larger. This 
difference reflects the much greater temperatures in the Chernobyl accident, in which the 
majority of the fuel completely melted, than at Windscale where the only some of the fuel 
elements slightly melted. The greater temperature resulted in a greater release of the more 
refractory elements from the reactor. 
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Figure 3.4: The distribution of 137Cs deposition near the Chernobyl site (10th May 1986), taken 
from Izraehl‟ 1990. 1 Ci m-2 = 3.7x1010 Bq m-2. 
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Figure 3.5: Map of the γ-dose rate (mR/h) in the European part of the former USSR (late May 
to early June 1986), taken from Izraehl‟ 1990. 
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238
Pu 
 
0.03 
 
 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
 
0.035 
 
239
Pu 
 
0.03 
 
 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
 
239
Np 
 
4 
 
 
 
170 
 
1 700 
 
945 
 
240
Pu 
 
0.04 
 
 
 
0.04 
 
0.04 
 
0.042 
 
241
Pu 
 
5 
 
 
 
6.0 
 
5.9 
 
~6 
 
242
Cm 
 
0.7 
 
 
 
0.9 
 
0.9 
 
0.9 
 
Table 3.4: The composition of the activity released from the accident at Chernobyl, USSR, 
April 26
th
 1986. The values given in the INSAG 1986 report are decay corrected to May 6
th
 and 
have uncertainties of 50%. The values given by Gudiksen et. al.1991 are decay-corrected for three 
days after the accident and have uncertainties of 30%. The remaining estimates are decay corrected 
for April 26
th
. 
 
 
3.4 General Features of Source Terms 
 
For accidents involving nuclear reactors or reprocessing plants the source term may be 
complex, but has some general features that result from the fuel history, the temperature  
during the accident and the state of containment. The source terms for other accidents are 
generally much simpler, for example, a lost source may consist of just one radioisotope, which 
may already be known. Similarly potential source terms for nuclear weapons accidents will 
generally be known. 
 
The following sections examine some of the factors which influence reactor accident source 
terms. 
 
3.4.1 Dependence of source terms on fuel history 
 
For an accident at a reactor, the history of the fuel, in particular its age, and the power of the 
reactor in the hours or days prior to the accident, determines the radionuclide inventory and 
thus constrains the release term. Unirradiated fuel comprises fissile and fissionable actinides, 
mainly α-emitters of low specific activity, and their immediate decay products. After short 
periods of irradiation in the reactor these are supplemented by fission products produced in 
proportion to their fission yields. With prolonged irradiation the quantities of short lived 
fission products progressively saturate, as production and decay rates equalise. Longer lived 
products and stable fission products grow in from isobaric decay chains, and transuranic 
nuclides and other activation products are produced. In this manner the composition of the 
radioactive inventory of the fuel changes, while its specific activity generally increases. 
Irradiation history therefore determines the activities which might be affected by accidents and 
partly released.  
 
Post-irradiation delays result in preferential loss of shorter lived nuclides, thus providing one 
mechanism for simplification of the source term. Power variations during irradiation also  
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influence the relative proportions of short and long lived nuclides, and of products with high 
neutron capture cross sections whose concentrations depend on burn-up. 
 
 
In the case of the Windscale fire the accident involved relatively young fuel and the power had 
been reduced 2-3 days prior to the start of the Wigner release, thus simplifying the source term 
in relation to short lived fission products. For the Chernobyl accident the power was reduced 
to 50% of normal operating levels 12 hours before the accident, and to about 10% 4 hours 
before the accident. This shorter low power period and the larger, older fuel load resulted in  
the larger, more complex source term. 
 
The material released at the Kyshtym accident had been stored for over a year, allowing the 
decay of shorter lived fission products. 
 
3.4.2 Dependence of source terms on temperature 
 
The temperature of the core during an accident is an important parameter in determining the 
source term. The thermal history of the accident, together with the chemical and physical 
composition of material in the core, determines the proportions of the active inventory which 
are mobilised for potential release. The outcome will depend upon the volatility of the 
elements and compounds present, release from the core proceeding in order of noble gases, 
volatile components (eg: iodine nuclides) and less volatile materials in order of increasing 
temperature. The nature and state of fuel cladding, and the physical form of the fuel are also 
significant. 
 
Core temperature played a significant part, for example, in differentiating the release of noble 
gases and volatile elements at Three Mile Island from the wider range of nuclides, including 
refractory fission products, and actinides at Chernobyl. In the case of the Cosmos-954 satellite 
crash volatile elements burned up during re-entry, the solid material reaching ground level thus 
comprising predominantly less volatile nuclides. 
 
The temperature of the core also affects the dispersion of the radionuclides once they are 
released, particularly if there is a complete loss of containment. A very hot core will result in 
the particles and gases released being carried further up into the atmosphere as a result of 
buoyancy effects, from where they will be carried further before being deposited on the  
ground. 
  
3.4.3 Dependence of source terms on containment 
 
Another factor determining the source term for a nuclear accident is the state of the reactor 
containment during and after the accident. For reactors the containment comprises the fuel 
cladding, the reactor vessel and in some cases a containment building, each of which acts as 
a barrier to accidental release. If the containment is intact then the release of radionuclides into 
the environment will be small. On the other hand, an accident in which the containment is 
destroyed will result in the release to the environment of all the radionuclides that are released 
from the core. If the containment fails some time after the accident there will be a smaller  
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release of radioactive material as a result of the decay of short lived nuclides and the plate-out 
of particulates and adsorbed species inside the containment building. 
 
In de Boeck 1993 three classes of containment failure are considered; early failure, late failure 
and containment bypass. An early containment failure is a failure of the containment prior to 
or shortly after core debris enter the reactor vessel. Possible early failure mechanisms include 
direct containment heating in which the heat from core debris causes the containment vessel  
to overpressurise, steam explosions in which steam generation results in a shock wave, 
hydrogen combustion or isolation failures. Late containment failures are failures of the 
containment in the longer term. Possible late failure mechanisms include late burning of 
combustible gases, gradual overpressurisation, basemat meltthrough and overheating. 
Containment bypass failures are accident scenarios in which the containment is completely 
bypassed, for example when primary coolant escapes into secondary buildings without first 
being discharged into the containment volume. 
 
The state of the containment will also affect the distance over which radionuclides are 
deposited. This is a result of a containment building increasing the time it takes for the 
radionuclides released from the core to reach the atmosphere, by which time the air 
transporting them will have cooled. Cooler air will not rise as far into the atmosphere when 
it gets outside the containment building, and so the radionuclides will be deposited closer to 
the accident site. 
 
In the case of the Windscale fire filtration was thought to have intercepted approximately 60% 
of the nuclides (Arnold 1992). At Three Mile Island the containment building made a critical 
difference to the radiological outcome. The absence of effective containment to deal with the 
forces of the Chernobyl blast had far reaching consequences for the release. 
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4. GAMMA-RAY SPECTRA 
 
4.1 AGS Systems 
 
Airborne gamma-ray survey (AGS) systems consist of a γ-ray detector, most commonly a high 
volume sodium iodide (NaI) system, mounted on an aircraft. The response of the system 
depends on the ability of γ-rays to penetrate a few hundred metres in air. Thus, an aircraft 
flying at an altitude of 100m or less can readily measure spectroscopic information from γ -
emitting radionuclides on, or just below, the surface. Analysis of such spectra allows the total 
γ-dose rate and the activities of some individual radionuclides to be determined. By linking 
the spectrometer with positional information (eg: from a GPS system) maps of the distribution 
of activity can be produced. The use of computers allows the spectra to be analysed rapidly, 
enabling such maps to be produced shortly after the aircraft has landed.  
 
AGS systems were initially developed for geological purposes, in particular uranium 
exploration. However with improvements to detectors, electronics and computing facilities 
they have also proven useful in environmental surveys. AGS has been used to map natural 
radioactive backgrounds for the purpose of epidemiological studies of cancer, studies of 
discharges from nuclear facilities, mapping of fall-out from past nuclear accidents and weapons 
tests, and as part of preparations for nuclear emergency responses. 
 
The advantages of AGS systems are the speed of data collection and presentation, and the large 
areas that can be easily and rapidly mapped. The data collected, being the total activity present 
in a relatively large area, avoid problems with sub-sampling errors (where a small sample area 
may not be representative of the whole local environment). The limitations of current AGS 
systems include the relative lack of sensitivity to radioisotopes that emit only low energy γ-
rays and the poor energy resolution inherent in NaI detectors, resulting in spectral interferences 
in complex cases. It is possible to use Ge semiconductor detectors which have a much higher 
resolution, but their efficiency is considerably lower, limiting the statistical precision available 
in short integration times, except in highly active areas. Further details of the principles of 
AGS systems can be found in ICRU 1994 and IAEA 1991. Details of the SURRC AGS system 
can be found in Sanderson et. al. 1990a, 1995b. 
 
4.2 Spectra Recorded From Past Accidents 
 
Gamma-ray spectra were recorded following several accidents using aerial survey systems, in 
situ spectrometry and from a variety of samples. These spectra were recorded over extended 
periods of time after the accident, but for the present report, considering primarily short lived 
fission products, only those spectra recorded within one year of the accident will be 
considered. 
 
Spectra recorded after the Windscale fire 
 
An aerial survey around the Windscale site was conducted between the 19
th
 and 22
nd
 October 
1957, Williams et. al. 1958. This survey consisted solely of a measurement of the total dose 
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rate using small volume NaI(Tl) detectors, recorded in-flight on a paper chart. Due to the 
equipment available, no spectrometric information was recorded at the time, so far as can be 
determined, either from the air or the ground. 
 
Spectra recorded after the Crash of Cosmos-954 
 
Because of the size of the area to be covered, the primary means of locating the fragments of 
Cosmos-954 was an aerial survey using γ-ray spectrometers mounted in four Hercules aircraft. 
The Geological Survey of Canada (GSC) spectrometer consisted of a 50 350 cm
3
 NaI detector 
from which 256 channel γ-ray spectra were recorded. Additional flights, at a lower altitude, 
were conducted using detection equipment mounted on helicopters. These flights were used 
to more precisely locate fragments observed from the Hercules aircraft, and they were also 
more sensitive to small sources. When a source had been located by airborne methods, it was 
precisely located and removed by personnel on the ground. Approximately 3500 minute 
particles were eventually collected over a four month period. 
 
Correction for the large natural background at the crash site was a major consideration, 
resulting in the need to use a ratio technique to distinguish between natural and artificial 
radiation sources, and is described by Bristow 1978. This involved taking the ratio of the 
number of counts in a window from 300-900 keV (due mainly to fission products) to the 
number of counts in a window from 900-1500 keV (due mainly to natural sources). Figure 4.1 
shows the total count rate and this ratio along a flight path overflying the first fragment to be 
positively identified, the strong signal at 1.5 km is artificial but the weaker signal from 3 km 
is due to natural background. The ratio only picks out the artificial signal. This ratio technique 
made it possible to determine anomalous readings corresponding to artificial point sources on 
the ground, and hence locate fragments of the satellite. 
 
A technique to remove the natural contribution to the spectra showing enhanced man-made 
activity was also devised, and is again described by Bristow 1978. This involved summing 20 
natural spectra (10 from each side of the anomaly) and each of the spectra recorded over the 
anomaly is scaled by a factor of 20. The background is then subtracted from the anomalous 
spectra, and the result smoothed. Figure 4.2 shows the natural background and fission product 
spectra recorded with this equipment for the first fragment to be positively identified. The 
fission product spectrum shows the typical predominance of low energy γ-lines due to several 
fission products. 
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Figure 4.1: The total count profile for a flight line over the first confirmed fragment from 
Cosmos-954 showing the use of the ratio technique. Taken from Grasty 1980. 
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Figure 4.2: A typical natural γ-ray spectrum and fission product spectrum for the first 
confirmed fragment of the Cosmos-954 satellite, recorded with the GSC NaI based spectrometer. 
Taken from Grasty 1980. 
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Spectra recorded after the Chernobyl accident 
 
Following the Chernobyl accident a very large number of radiological surveys were conducted, 
many of which used γ-ray spectrometry methods. These included measurements on samples 
of soil, plants, water, air filters and other materials. There were also a range of in-situ 
measurements, and surveys using detectors mounted on aircraft or ground vehicles. The 
following is a collection of some of the spectra recorded by these various methods up to about 
a year after the accident. 
 
The first airborne γ-ray surveys following the accident were conducted in Sweden by the 
Swedish Geological Company (SGAB) in cooperation with the Swedish National Institute of 
Radiation Protection (SSI), and are described in Mellander 1989. The SGAB γ-ray 
spectrometer consisted of a 16.8 litre NaI(Tl) detector, although due to the high count rates 
only half of this was used initially, producing 256 channel spectra. This was mounted in the 
luggage compartment of an Aero Commander 680 twin engine fixed wing aircraft. The first 
survey of Chernobyl fall-out began on the afternoon of the 1
st
 May 1986, 4 days after the 
radioactive cloud was first detected over Sweden. The whole of Sweden, except for the far 
north, had been mapped by the 8
th
 May with east-west lines 100 km apart at an altitude of 
150m. On the morning of the 9
th
 May the aircraft returned south to map the fall-out from a 
new radioactive cloud (flying through the cloud on the way, contaminating the aircraft). 
Between the 9
th
 and 23
rd
 May the whole country was covered with 50 km line spacing. Figure 
4.3 shows a spectrum measured in May 1986 with the 8.4l detector, and figure 4.4 shows a 
spectrum measured in June 1987 using the full 16.8l detector. These spectra show several 
peaks, corresponding to a large number of different γ-lines. The earlier spectrum shows peaks 
at approximately 550keV, 630keV, 780keV, 1500keV and 1600keV. The peak at 1500keV 
includes 
40
K lines (natural background), the peak at 1600keV is due largely to 
140
La. Initial 
caesium deposition maps were based on the 780keV signal, calibrated by ground to air 
comparisons, and assumed to be largely composed of 
134
Cs. In the later spectrum many of 
these peaks have disappeared (for example the 1600keV La peak), and other peaks have 
become apparent including a 660keV peak due to 
137
Cs. 
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Figure 4.3: A γ-ray spectrum measured with the SGAB 8.4l NaI detector at an altitude of 150m 
in May 1986. Taken from Mellander 1989. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: A γ-ray spectrum measured with the SGAB 16.8l NaI detector at an altitude of 
150m in June 1987. Taken from Mellander 1989. 
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On the 29
th
 April 1986 the survey aircraft of the Geological Survey of Finland (GSF) was 
returning from a survey in the north of Finland to Helsinki. Having heard on the radio that 
significant levels of radioactivity had been detected in Finland and Sweden they had turned on 
their spectrometer consisting of 25 litres of NaI, recording 120 channel spectra covering an 
energy range of 200 to 3100 keV using a 1 s livetime. During the course of this flight they 
flew through the radioactive plume from the Chernobyl accident, heavily contaminating the 
aircraft. Peaks attributed to iodine, caesium and lanthanum isotopes were visible (Multala 
1995), although it has subsequently been realised that 
132
I interferes with both Cs peaks. Figure 
4.5 shows a spectrum recorded over a 30 minute period in the cloud (Grasty et. al. 1996.), 
importantly the 
131
I peak is well resolved. This peak was not clearly resolved in the spectra 
recorded by the SGAB group in early May (figure 4.3), where it is within a much larger 
background due to the scattering of higher energy γ-rays in the atmosphere.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: A γ-ray spectrum measured with the GSF NaI based spectrometer within the 
Chernobyl plume averaged over 30 minutes, taken from Grasty et. al. 1996. 
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An airborne survey of the highly contaminated areas of central Norway was conducted between 
5
th
 May and 6
th
 June 1986 to complement a survey of the entire country conducted with car 
based spectrometers (Lindahl & Haabrekke 1986). 
 
Airborne surveys around the site of the accident and in neighbouring regions were conducted 
from May 1986 (Stukin 1991 and Nagaoka et. al. 1994). These surveys utilised the "Makfar-
2" spectrometric system and was conducted by the "Aerogeology" division of the Soviet 
Ministry of Geology. This system is composed of NaI(Tl) crystals arranged to produce total 
volumes between 1.25l and 48l, with on-board data storage and ground-based computer 
processing. The surveys covered a 5 km zone around the plant with a 100m line spacing, a 60 
km zone with 500m spacing and five other regions with a 3km line spacing. 
 
In addition to the airborne surveys, various measurements were also made using in-situ 
spectrometers. An example of such measurements were those made at the German Institute for 
Radiation Hygiene near Munich (Winkelmann et. al. 1987). Figure 4.6 shows spectra 
recorded, using a Ge detector with an integration time of 30 mins, before and after the 
Chernobyl accident. The peaks in the spectrum recorded before the accident shows a normal 
natural background from the Th series (
208
Tl, 
212
Pb and 
228
Ac), the U series (
214
Bi and 
214
Pb), 
40
K and the 511keV line due to electron-positron annihilation (the positrons are formed by pair 
production, in which a high energy γ-ray interacts with matter producing an electron-positron 
pair). The spectrum recorded after the accident shows a large number of additional γ-ray peaks 
superimposed on this background, some of which are identified or resolved from other peaks. 
 
Samples of soil and rainwater were collected in many locations across Europe, several of 
which were analysed using γ-spectroscopic methods. Figures 4.7-4.11 show a selection of 
spectra from samples collected in Denmark (Hovgaard & Korsbech 1992) and at the Scottish 
Universities Research and Reactor Centre. Again, these spectra contain a large number of 
peaks from several radionuclei; in the NaI spectra these are composites of several different 
discrete γ-lines, and even with the Ge spectra some of them are not fully resolved. With the 
exception of the clay samples, these spectra only contain γ-rays from fission products due to 
the advantage of being able to shield the sample and detector from the environmental 
background. The spectra shown in figure 4.10 are from a clean clay sample, and the same clay 
sample contaminated with a small amount of the gutter mud used for the measurement in figure 
4.9. This increased the total counts at energies below 900 keV by 6-7%. 
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Figure 4.6: γ-ray spectra recorded with an in-situ Ge based spectrometer at the German 
Insitute for Radiation Hygiene before (top) and after the Chernobyl accident. Taken from 
Winkelmann et al 1987. 
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Figure 4.7: A γ-ray spectrum of rainwater collected on the 7th May 1986 in Copenhagen, 
measured with a 10cmx10cm NaI(Tl) detector. Taken from Hovgaard & Korsbech 1992.  
 
Figure 4.8: A γ-ray spectrum of rainwater collected on the 7th May 1986 in Copenhagen, 
measured with a Ge(Li) detector. Taken from Hovgaard & Korsbech 1992. 
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Figure 4.9: A γ-ray spectrum of mud from a gutter collected on the 13th May 1986, measured 
with a 10cmx10cm NaI(Tl) detector. Taken from Hovgaard & Korsbech 1992. 
Figure 4.10: γ-ray spectra from clay samples measured with a 10cmx10cm NaI(Tl) detector. 
Curve 1 is for a clean sample of clay, and curve 2 is for a sample contaminated with the  
mud measured previously (figure 4.9). Taken from Hovgaard & Korsbech 1992.  
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Figure 4.11: A γ-ray spectrum from rain water collected from the roof of the Scottish 
Universities Research and Reactor Centre on the 6
th
 May 1986 measured with a 130 cm
3
 Ge(Li) 
detector. The spectrum shows some of the peaks separated from the total spectrum. 
 
 
 
Following the accident, measurements were made from clothing worn by people in the area 
of the accident. Figure 4.12 shows the spectrum recorded using a Ge counter on clothing worn 
in Kiev, taken from Ali et. al. 1986. There are several radioisotopes identifiable in this 
spectrum, most prominently due to 
131
I, 
103
Ru, 
134,137
Cs, 
95
Nb, 
95
Zr, 
140
La and 
141,144
Ce. 
 
The Chernobyl accident also resulted in the release of a large number of "hot" particles,  
minute particles of highly radioactive material. These particles were suspended in the air and 
deposited downwind of the accident, in some sites accounting for 90% of the activity (Stukin 
1991). It was found that these particles could be divided into two types; those derived from 
fuel containing fuel material and radionuclides that had accumulated during the reactors 
operational life, and particles formed by the condensation of radionuclides onto an existing 
particle. Some particles were composed of a fuel particle onto which other radionuclides had 
condensed. The composition of the second type of particle varied greatly depending on the 
radionuclides available for condensation, the nature of the condensation nucleus and the 
temperature of formation. Figure 4.13 shows the spectrum from one such particle collected 
1 500 m south west of the reactor, measured with a semi-conductor detector.  This particle has 
a very strong peak due to 
106
Ru, significantly larger than the 
137
Cs peak, however, the spectrum 
recorded from a soil sample collected at the same location had a strong 
137
Cs peak but a small 
106
Ru peak. As would be expected, the composition of such particles can be significantly 
different from the bulk composition of the fall out. 
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Figure 4.12: γ-ray spectrum recorded using a Ge detector from an item of clothing 
contaminated in Kiev. Taken from Ali et. al. 1986. 
 
 
Samples taken by air filters were also studied using γ-ray spectrometers. Among these were 
samples collected at the German Institute for Radiation Hygiene using a high purity planar Ge 
detector (Winkelmann et. al. 1987) and by the AEA at Harwell, γ-ray spectra from these 
samples are shown in figures 4.14-4.16. These spectra are far simpler than those measured by 
other means, this is because air filters only measure those radioisotopes that are suspended in 
the air near the ground. They can not measure the radioisotopes still suspended at altitude, or 
those already settled on the ground.  The spectrum recorded in Germany has a peak due to 
239
Np, which was not present in later samples. The early spectrum from Harwell is dominated 
by Te and I isotopes, the later spectrum is dominated by Cs isotopes. The measurements made 
a significant time after the radioactive cloud has past are the result of resuspension of material, 
for example by the wind. 
 
Whole-body monitoring was conducted on several people who had been exposed to nuclear 
material escaping from the reactor. Figure 4.17 shows the spectra recorded using NaI and Ge 
detectors from a subject who had been in Kiev for four days following the accident, taken from 
Ali et. al. 1986. The presence of several radioisotopes released in the accident, including 
iodine and caesium isotopes, are clearly visible. 
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Figure 4.13: The γ-ray spectrum recorded using a Ge detector from a “hot” particle from a site 
1 500 m south west of the Chernobyl reactor. Taken from Stukin 1991. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.14: Part of a γ-ray spectrum using a high purity planar Ge detector from an air filter 
sample collected at the German Institute For Radiation Hygiene on the afternoon of the 1
st
 May 
1986. Taken from Winkelmann et. al. 1987. 
37 
 
 
Figure 4.15: A γ-ray spectrum using a Ge detector from an air filter sample collected by the 
AEA at Harwell on the 2
nd
 May 1986. Provided by Ian Adsley, AEA Gamma Spec. Lab. 
 
 
Figure 4.16: A γ-ray spectrum using a Ge detector from an air filter sample collected by the 
AEA at Harwell on the 2
nd
 December 1986. Provided by Ian Adsley, AEA Gamma Spec. Lab. 
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Figure 4.17: Whole body spectra of a person who had been in Kiev for four days after the 
nuclear accident recorded with NaI and Ge detectors. Taken fron Ali et. al. 1986.  
 
 
4.3 General Features of Gamma Spectra 
 
A number of general observations can be made about the γ-spectra observed following nuclear 
accidents. Firstly, as noted, the complexity of the source term depends on the state of the 
reactor and its containment prior to and during the accident. Accidents occurring at full power 
with „old‟ fuel will tend to involve more complex source terms, containing short lived and long 
lived components, including activation products; by contrast the source terms associated with 
low power operation or recently fuelled systems will tend to be simpler. Also, as noted, the 
accident conditions, together with cladding and containment will influence the parts of the 
radioactive inventory released to the environment; its physical and chemical form playing a 
role in subsequent transport and deposition processes. 
 
The spectra measured shortly after a major accident involving a complex release of radioactive 
material show a large number of γ-ray peaks, mostly at the low energy end of the spectrum. 
However, the majority of the peaks observed in these spectra are due to a relatively few 
radioisotopes, with a significant background due to the large number of weaker γ-emitters 
present.  
 
In spectra recorded with NaI detectors, and even with higher resolution Ge detectors, many 
of the peaks are composites of several γ-rays, some of which are not identified. Thus, to 
determine the activity due to individual radioisotopes it is necessary to account for other γ-ray 
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lines included in the relevant peak. This is not necessarily straight forward, and in some cases 
may not be possible even with spectra recorded using Ge detectors. 
 
Spectra recorded from an AGS system are also influenced by scattering processes in the air 
path, generating an increased low energy background. Also the requirement to have a short 
integration time (typically a few seconds) coupled with attenuation by the intervening 
atmosphere results in reduced statistics. This is a particular problem with Ge detectors because 
of their much lower intrinsic efficiency, although it would be less problematic in high radiation 
fields. An additional problem associated with Ge detectors is a reduction in resolution due to 
the aircraft vibration. If there are radionuclides still suspended in the air at the time of the 
survey then γ-rays from these airborne sources would also be detected. Contamination of the 
aircraft by airborne particles could also be a problem immediately following an accident. The 
separation of γ-rays emitted from the ground, the air and aircraft contamination would be 
particularly difficult. In addition, because of the large number of spectra recorded during an 
airborne survey the interpretation of such spectra has to be conducted automatically by 
computer, and in the situation of an emergency response this has to be rapid.  
 
From experience of past accidents it is clear that airborne measurements are capable of locating 
and mapping areas of high activity. The differences between spectra recorded after the re-entry 
of the Cosmos-954 satellite over northern Canada (showing a loss of volatile components), and 
those recorded after Chernobyl  which apparently showed differences between Sweden and 
Finland  reflect the different conditions occurring in these cases. More detailed analysis of 
sources prepared under controlled conditions is needed to develop robust strategies for spectral 
analysis under accident conditions. However in the meantime the evidence of past accidents 
is that even the poorly resolved NaI spectra can be used, with appropriate ground-to-air 
calibration, for dose rate estimation and fallout mapping. 
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APPENDIX A. Types of nuclear reactor accidents. 
 
An accident involving the loss of, or a reduction in the flow of, coolant results in an increase 
in the temperature of the core. This can result in damage to fuel elements, which in turn 
releases radioactive materials into the coolant channels. A coolant leak would allow any 
gaseous or volatile radionuclides present in the coolant to enter the reactor building, and if the 
containment is poor, into the outside environment. Loss of liquid coolant also usually results 
in the remaining coolant boiling, which results in an increase in coolant voids which could 
result in an increase in activity (if the design has a positive void coefficient, see below). 
Various events can result in a reduction in the efficiency of the cooling system, and hence 
overheating of fuel elements. These include foreign objects blocking the flow of coolant and 
the loss of a turbine, which is a major heat-sink in a power plant. 
 
Accidents also occur following sudden increases in reactor reactivity (sudden reductions in 
reactivity, although still `incidents', usually result in a power reduction and cause no serious 
damage). Reactivity can increase suddenly during the removal of control rods, or the insertion 
of moderator or new fuel. The resulting increase in power (or power excursion) is 
accompanied by a sudden burst of neutron and γ-radiation, which can harm or even kill 
anyone in the reactor room at the time, if there is inadequate biological shielding. The power 
increase also results in a sudden increase in the pressure of the coolant, which can cause 
mechanical damage to the coolant pipes or even the reactor pressure vessel. Accidents 
involving reactivity changes often have the most serious effects, since these accidents occur 
in very short time periods and can release a very large amount of energy. With such fast events 
the scram system may not be able to shut down the reactor before damage occurs, although 
well designed systems should prevent serious damage. 
 
In some reactor designs activity can also increase as a result of voids developing in the coolant, 
ie: the reactor has a positive void coefficient. This occurs if the reactor is over moderated,  
with criticality maintained by the absorption of neutrons in the moderator. In such a situation 
boiling of the coolant, which acts as a moderator, creates voids and hence a reduction in 
moderator density. This results in an increase in thermal neutron flux, and the reactor goes 
supercritical. A positive feedback loop occurs, as more activity generates more heat, and 
further voiding. In most reactor designs the reactor is under moderated, and the coolant acts  
as significant part of the moderator. In this situation there is a negative void coefficient, in 
which boiling of the coolant results in a reduction in moderation. This reduces the thermal 
neutron flux, and hence the fission rate, resulting in a power reduction. This provides an 
inherent safety mechanism which is much faster than inserting control rods.  
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APPENDIX B. Incidents at nuclear facilities with no off-site consequences. 
 
 
Date 
 
Facility 
 
Description of incident 
 
Refs. 
 
21/9/45 
21/5/46 
 
Los Alamos, USA 
critical assembly 
 
Two accidents occurred following the mishandling of reflectors, 
resulting in power excursions. Two experimenters died, but the core 
was undamaged. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
12/49 
 
Water Boiler, USA 
research reactor 
 
Two controls rods were manually lifted from the core, resulting in a 
power excursion. The reactor was undamaged. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
18/4/52 
 
JEMIMA, Los Alamos 
critical assembly 
 
A computational error and violation of the operating procedure 
resulted in a power excursion. An automatic scram stopped the 
reaction, no damage was done. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
12/12/52 
 
NRX, Canada 
research reactor 
 
A sequence of mistakes, ending with the withdrawal of control rods 
resulted in a power surge, with a positive void coefficient, destroying 
the reactor. About 1014Bq of long lived fission fragments collected in 
the basement. 
 
IAEA 1994 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Thompson and 
  Beckerley 1964 
 
15/3/53 
 
Reprocessing plant, 
Chelyabinsk, USSR 
 
A container of Pu was loaded twice, without the knowledge of the 
operators. Two operators were irradiated. 
 
Puit 1996 
 
4/1/55 
 
Hanford KW Reactor, 
Washington, USA 
 
A coolant tube was blocked by a neoprene disk, resulting in a ruptured 
fuel element. The entire graphite channel had to be removed through 
a hole cut in the rear concrete shield wall after all standard methods to 
remove it had failed. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Thompson and 
  Beckerley 1964 
 
29/11/55 
 
EBR-1, Idaho, USA 
research reactor 
 
A study of fast power rise was to be terminated with a manual shut off 
button. Due to operator error, the wrong button was pressed.  The 
power excursion melted 40% of the fuel elements before the correct 
button could be pressed.. 
 
IAEA 1994 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Thompson and 
  Beckerley 1964 
 
23/7/56 
 
Materials Testing 
Reactor, Idaho, USA 
 
During scheduled refuelling a highly active reactor component was 
placed in an inadequately shielded position. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
21/4/57 
 
Reprocessing plant, 
Chelyabinsk, USSR 
 
U oxide precipitation accumulated in a tank. One operator died, and 
a further 5 were seriously irradiated. 
 
Puit 1996  
 
2/1/58 
 
Reprocessing plant, 
Chelyabinsk, USSR 
 
A container was tipped for emptying, the resulting change in geometry 
caused the solution to go critical. Three operators died, and another  
was blinded. 
 
Puit 1996 
 
23/5/58 
 
NRU, Chalk River, 
Canada 
research reactor 
 
Water seeped into a fuel element, causing it to burst. The building was 
badly contaminated while removing the damaged element from the 
core. 
 
IAEA 1994 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Thompson and 
  Beckerley 1964 
 
16/6/58 
 
Y12 reprocessing plant, 
Oak Ridge, USA 
 
8 operators irradiated in a criticality accident. 
 
Puit 1996 
 
15/10/58 
 
Vinca, Yugoslavia 
critical assembly 
 
The reactor went supercritical following the failure of instrumentation. 
One person died, and another five suffered severe radiation sickness. 
The reactor was undamaged. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
18/11/58 
 
HTRE-3, Idaho 
research reactor 
 
Faults in the design of detectors resulted in an unnoticed power 
increase. An automatic scram occurred, but only after several fuel 
elements had partially melted. 
 
IAEA 1994 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Thompson and 
  Beckerley 1964 
Stratton 1967 
 
30/12/58 
 
Los Alamos, 
reprocessing plant 
 
Pu storage limits in a tank were exceeded, which went critical killing 
one operator.  
 
Puit 1996 
 
15/3/60 
 
Alize, Saclay, France 
critical assembly 
 
Operator error resulted in the removal of a control rod, creating a 
power excursion. The core was undamaged. 
 
IAEA 1994 
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5/12/60 
 
Reprocessing plant, 
Chelyabinsk, USSR 
 
Pu limit was exceeded during a transfer to a storage tank. Several 
operators were slightly irradiated. 
 
Puit 1996 
 
25/1/61 
 
Reprocessing plant, 
Idaho, USA 
 
After a release of compressed gas enriched U solution entered the 
evaporator. The area was highly contaminated. 
 
Puit 1996 
 
4/7/61 
 
Submarine reactor 
accident 
 
The accident occurred in the first Soviet missile-carrying nuclear 
submarine, and details were not released until 1990. There was a loss 
of pressure in the primary coolant circuit in one of the two reactors on 
board. The emergency shut down system functioned correctly, but a 
fire broke out in the reactor compartment and the submarine surfaced. 
Normal cooling of the reactor was not possible, and the core 
temperature began to rise. A temporary emergency cooling system was 
rigged using piping from several weapons systems and the submarines 
fresh water reserve, this involved welding work inside the reactor 
compartment. All the compartments of the submarine were 
contaminated, and 8 crewmen died within one month. 
 
Kuznetzov 1991 
 
14/8/61 
 
Reprocessing plant, 
Tomsk, USSR 
 
U accumulated in the oil tank of a transfer pump. One operator was 
irradiated. 
 
Puit 1996 
 
16/10/61 
 
Reprocessing plant, 
Idaho, USA 
 
Enriched U solution was transferred to a tank already containing waste 
material, which overflowed into the shielded basement. 
 
Puit 1996 
 
26/10/61 
 
SPERT-3, Idaho, USA 
 
A crack in the pressurizer was discovered along a welded seam. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Heffner et. al.1962 
 
12/12/61 
 
Engineering Test 
Reactor, USA 
 
Water flow was blocked by a plastic "sight box" used during 
maintenance. Melting occurred in small portions of 6 fuel elements, 
and the building was badly contaminated 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
7/4/62 
 
Pu processing plant, 
Hanford, WA, USA 
 
Pu vapours were released from a can, which should have been empty. 
3 operators were irradiated over a 37hr period. 
 
Puit 1996 
 
7/9/62 
 
Reprocessing plant, 
Chelyabinsk, USSR 
 
Pu limit exceeded following the arrival of waste abnormally rich in Pu. 
 
Puit 1996 
 
7/10/62 
 
Portable Medium Power 
Plant 3A (PM-3A), 
McMurdo Sound, 
Antarctica 
 
Accumulation of hydrogen in the upper portion of the containment 
vessel was ignited by a short circuit (which also triggered a scram). 
The result was a small fire of short duration, damaging some control 
systems. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
ORNL,NSIC 1966 
Buchanan 1963b 
 
13/11/62 
 
Materials Testing 
Reactor, Idaho, USA 
 
Water flow to several fuel plates was blocked by rubber debris from 
a gasket. Partial melting occurred. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
30/1/63 
 
Reprocessing plant, 
Tomsk, USSR 
 
For a 10hr period there was no control of the U concentration of 
solutions transferred to a storage reservoir. 
 
Puit 1996 
 
1/7/63 
 
Oak Ridge Reactor, Oak 
Ridge, USA 
research reactor 
 
A large neoprene gasket lodged on one of the fuel elements, blocking 
coolant flow. One of the fuel plates of this element was partially 
molten, about 4x1013 Bq of fission products entered the cooling water. 
 
IAEA 1994 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Colomb and Tims 
  1963/4 
ORNL,NSIC 1966 
 
Autumn 
1963  
 
University of Michigan 
Reactor, USA 
 
A thimble was ruptured allowing water from the pool to leak onto the 
experimental floor. No damage occurred.  
 
IAEA 1994 
 
18/10/63 
 
University of Virginia 
Reactor, USA 
 
A break in piping occurred lowering water level in the pool. No 
damage resulted from the loss of water. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
11/63 
 
Agriculture and 
Mechanics College 
Reactor, Texas 
 
A leaking gasket allowed water to leak from the pool. Pool water 
activity was 1.6 106 Bq ml-1. No serious consequences resulted from 
the accident. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
3/12/63 
 
Reprocessing plant, 
Tomsk, USSR 
 
For an 18hr period there was no control of the U concentration of 
solutions transferred to a storage reservoir. 
 
Puit 1996 
 
1964-79 
 
Byeloyarsk NPP, USSR 
 
Over a 15 year period fuel assemblies were persistently damaged by 
overheating. During repair work staff were over exposed. 
 
Medvedev 1989 
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29/9/65 
 
Plutonium Recycle Test 
Reactor (PRTR), 
Richmond, Washington 
 
A rupture in a metal sheath within a coolant channel resulted in a low 
pressure signal and a scram. There was a release of radioactive water 
and gas to the containment vessel. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
USAEC 1965/6, 
  1975 
 
13/11/65 
 
Elektrostal fuel 
fabrication plant, 
Moscow, USSR 
 
UO2 powder was placed in a water tank, where it went critical. 
 
Puit 1996 
 
15/12/65 
 
Reprocessing plant, 
Chelyabinsk, USSR 
 
Because of an error in calculating the U content of waste the U mass 
limit was exceeded. 
 
Puit 1996 
 
30/12/65 
 
Venus (Mol), Belgium 
critical assembly 
 
During the manual removal of a control rod, the reactor became 
critical. The technician needed to have a foot amputated. The reactor 
was undamaged. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
1966-75 
 
BR2, Mol, Belgium 
research reactor 
 
Over a nine year period there were 11 accidents. There were 4 
leakages of fuel capsules outside the core; a 5.7 ton container fell close 
to spent fuel storage; a TeO2 capsule burnt releasing 4x10
11Bq of 131I 
into reactor building; hot cells were dropped 6m when the cable of a 
crane fractured; fuel element cladding failed; a 20 ton container used 
to carry irradiated fuel fell after the fracture of two cables; and a 350 
kg sodium loop fell following the fracture of a nylon cord; a 
screwdriver which had fallen into the core during shutdown blocked 
the coolant flow through one fuel element which partially melted. All 
incidents produced no contamination beyond the building. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
7/5/66 
 
Melekess NPP, USSR 
 
A prompt neutron surge resulted in some exposure of staff. The 
reactor was extinguished when two bags of boric acid were dumped in 
it. 
 
Medvedev 1989 
 
5/10/66 
 
Enrico Fermi Reactor, 
Detroit, USA 
 
Segments of zirconium sheets added to the coolant flow guide and 
vessel penetration barrier tore loose, blocking coolant flow through 
some fuel assemblies. The bulk of the fuel in two assemblies melted. 
 
Medvedev 1989 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Scott 1971 
 
7/2/68 
 
San Onofre, California 
 
A fire started in electrical cabling, the reactor was safely shut down. 
Incorrect wiring during repairs meant a control rod remained inserted. 
A second fire in March resulted in the loss of power to several 
systems, causing some problems during shut down.  
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
 
15/10/68  
 
ISIS, Saclay, France 
research reactor 
 
An experimental rig with negative reactivity was removed, leading to 
a power excursion. A few fuel elements were damaged, there was no 
external radiation hazard. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
10/12/68 
 
Reprocessing plant, 
Chelyabinsk, USSR 
 
The emptying of a reservoir in violation of regulations allowed Pu to 
accumulate. One operator died, another had his leg amputated. 
 
Puit 1996 
 
21/1/69 
 
Lucens Experimental 
Nuclear Power Station, 
Switzerland 
 
A breach in a seal of the carbon dioxide cooling system led to a 
complete loss of coolant pressure, and a reduction in the cooling 
potential of the gas. The fuel heated, and one element and cladding 
melted. Radioactive material, mostly 88Kr, escaped to the underground 
cavern housing the reactor. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Miller 1975 
Winiger and Halter 
  1977 
 
17/10/69 
 
Saint Larent, France 
 
During refuelling (with the reactor running) the operator over-rode 
automatic stops on the fuelling rig, resulting in a coolant flow restrictor 
rather than a fuel element being inserted. Some fuel elements melted. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Corbett 1971 
 
mid 1970 
 
H.R. Robinson NPP, 
South Carolina, USA 
 
During pre-start up pressure testing a valve burst. Seven men were 
injured. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Casto et. al.1970 
ORNL,NSIC 1972 
 
15/5/70 
 
La Crosse NPP, 
Wisconsin, USA 
 
A malfunction caused a valve to close, stopping steam supply to the 
turbine. Pressure in the reactor built up and a scram occurred. Normal 
pressure control was upset by a faulty relief valve, the water level fell 
below the top of the core. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Casto et. al.1970 
 
5/6/70 
 
Dresden-2 NPP, Illinois, 
USA 
 
A spurious signal opened the valves of the turbine steam supply, 
causing a reactor scram. As the water level in the reactor fell this valve 
closed, and water level began to rise. However, the indicator in the 
control room stuck, and operator added more water. The reactor was 
flooded, the drywell contaminated and some electrics shorted.  
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Cagle 1971 
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24/8/70 
 
Windscale fuel 
reprocessing plant 
 
Pu accumulated in a hydraulic system, mildly contaminating the area 
and irradiating two operators. 
 
Puit 1996 
 
30/9/70 
 
N Reactor, Hanford, 
Washington, USA 
 
A pump filter became clogged with foreign material. The primary 
scram system failed to activate, the reactor was shut down by the 
auxiliary scram system. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Gallagher 1971 
 
14/3/71 
 
Robinson-2 NPP, 
South Carolina, USA 
 
The emergency back-up battery was drained after an emergency pump 
was left running after a test. The reactor later scrammed, but the low 
battery power caused several auxiliary circuits to fail. The bearings in 
all 8 turbines and generators were damaged. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
ORNL,NSIC 1975 
Casto et. al.1971 
 
Nov 1971 
 
Indian Point NPP, New 
York, USA 
 
During construction of unit 2 a store room caught fire. The control 
room of unit 1 was filled with smoke, requiring breathing apparatus.  
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Scott et. al.1972 
 
1972 
 
Turkey Point-3, Florida, 
USA 
 
In pre-fuelling tests 3 of 4 safety valves suddenly separated from 2 
headers of the main steam line in the secondary system. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Casto et. al.1972 
 
Mar 1972 
 
Oconee-1 NPP, South 
Carolina, USA 
 
21 out of 52 in-core instrument nozzles broke off, causing extensive 
damage to the coolant system. This was revealed before start-up. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Casto et. al.1972 
 
9/6/72 
 
Quad Cities NPP, 
Illinois, USA 
 
The reactor was shut down after river water (used to condense steam) 
flooded the basement. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Casto et. al.1972 
 
27/7/72 
 
Surry-1 NPP, Virginia, 
USA 
 
During regular maintenance two men died as a result of steam burns. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Casto et. al.1973 
 
1/9/72 
 
Millstone-1 NPP, 
Connecticut, USA 
 
Seawater (used to condense steam) entered the primary coolant systems 
as a result of corrosion of tubes in the condenser. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Casto et. al.1973a,b 
ORNL,NSIC 1975 
 
7/11/73 
 
Vermont Yankee, 
Vermont, USA 
 
An interlock system to prevent the simultaneous removal of more than 
one control rod was nullified during a test to ensure the rods were free 
to move. Two rods were removed at once and the reactor went critical. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
ORNL,NSIC 1975 
 
Nov 1973 
 
Surry-1 NPP, Virginia, 
USA 
 
The main reactor coolant pump fractured resulting in a complete loss 
of coolant flow, the reactor scrammed. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
ORNL,NSIC 1975 
 
10/12/73 
 
Surry-2 NPP, Virginia, 
USA 
 
An operator was seriously injured when he was sucked through an 
airlock door into the containment building. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Casto et. al.1974 
 
20/8/74 
 
Beznau-1 NPP, 
Switzerland 
 
A turbine shut down a result of power grid fluctuations. The failure 
of a bypass valve caused an increase in the pressure in the steam 
generator, causing a reactor scram. The relief valve opened, but failed 
to close and steam flowed into the drain tank. A seal in the drain tank 
failed allowing primary water to flow onto the floor of the containment 
building.  
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Lafaille et. al.1974 
 
22/3/75 
 
Browns Ferry, Alabama, 
USA 
 
Both reactors were shut down after polyurethane foam was ignited by 
a candle used to check for air leaks. The loss of some wiring 
complicated the supply of coolant to unit 1.  
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Scott 1976 
 
7/75 
 
EWA, Swiek, Poland 
research reactor 
 
A programme of radiographic testing found several defects in the 
welding of joints in the reactor tank.  
 
IAEA 1994 
 
May 1975 
 
Robinson-2 , South 
Carolina, USA 
 
About 135000 gallons of primary coolant spilt into the containment 
building after a seal in the primary pump broke. Escape of radioactive 
material to the atmosphere was contained within prescribed limits. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
ORNL,NSIC 1978 
Casto et. al.1975 
 
5/11/75 
 
Cooper NPP, Nebraska, 
USA 
 
Incorrect wiring indicated that a closed valve was open. This allowed 
hydrogen gas to accumulate in a sump, the resultant explosion injured 
two men. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Casto et. al.1976 
ORNL,NSIC 1978 
 
7/1/76 
 
Cooper NPP, 
Nebraska, USA 
 
An ice plug inside the off gas stack resulted in a back pressure that 
allowed hydrogen into the off-gas building. An explosion demolished 
the building. Some radioactive materials were released into the vicinity 
of the building, but nothing beyond the site boundary. 
 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Casto et. al.1976 
ORNL,NSIC 1978 
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late 1976 
 
Millstone-1 NPP, 
Connecticut, USA 
 
The reactor went critical and was automatically scrammed when during 
a safety test the wrong control rod was withdrawn. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
ORNL,NSIC 1978 
 
1977 
 
Byeloyarsk NPP, USSR 
 
Half the fuel assemblies in the core melted. Repairs, during which the 
staff were exposed to radiation, lasted about a year. 
 
Medvedev 1989 
 
20/3/77 
 
Rancho Seco-1, 
California, USA 
 
A short circuit on the control panel (caused while an operator was 
replacing a bulb) cut power to two thirds of the non-nuclear 
instruments. The resulting erroneous signals caused the integrated 
control system (ICS) to shut off feedwater supply to the steam 
generators. The increase in primary water temperature and pressure 
resulted in a reactor scram. ICS kept valves closed because of 
erroneous signals, the temperature in the primary system was 
maintained by injecting cool water and correct operation of the relief 
valve. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Casto et. al.1978 
 
15/7/77 
 
Browns Ferry 3, 
Alabama, USA 
 
A fire occurred in a charcoal filter bed after a hydrogen build up due 
to a blocked drain in the air system reducing the efficiency of the 
catalytic recombination of hydrogen and oxygen.  
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Mays 1979 
 
24/9/77 
 
Davis Besse 1 NPP, 
Ohio,USA 
 
A valve controlling water supply to the steam generator closed, 
causing the water level in the steam generator to drop, and hence the 
temperature and pressure of the primary circuit to rise. The pressure 
relief valve stuck open, and steam escaped to the quench tank, and 
from there into the containment building when a rupture disk blew. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Casto et. al.1978 
 
3/3/78 
 
Crystal River 3 NPP, 
Florida, USA 
 
Parts of a burnable-poison-rod assembly were found in the steam 
generator, core and pressure vessel. A series of power tilt alarms 
(12/12/77 to 17/2/78) may have been due to the early stages of the 
disintegration of this assembly.  
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
Casto et. al.1979 
 
24/7/78 
 
Wood River Junction 
fuel fabrication plant, 
USA 
 
As a result of procedural errors, a canister of enriched U solution was 
emptied into a storage tank, which went critical. One operator died, 
and 2 more were irradiated. 
 
Puit 1996 
 
17/10/78 
 
Reprocessing plant, 
Idaho, USA 
 
U accumulated in a column as a result of an undetected flow of 
material. The area was highly contaminated. 
 
Puit 1996 
 
13/12/78 
 
Pu storage facility, 
Tomsk, USSR 
 
A container for 2 ingots of Pu was loaded with 3. One operator was 
irradiated. 
 
Puit 1996 
 
31/12/78 
 
Byeloyarsk NPP, USSR 
 
A fire was started when a roof panel fell onto a fuel tank. The control 
cables burned out, and the reactor went out of control. Eight people 
were exposed to severe doses of radiation in an effort to supply 
emergency cooling water. 
 
Medvedev 1989 
 
1979 
 
Montpelier 
 
One person had a leg amputated after handling a γ-source removed 
from the apparatus 
 
Pasquier 1996 
 
2/5/79 
 
Oyster Creek 1 NPP, 
New Jersey, USA 
 
A spurious electrical signal resulted in a scram and the disconnection 
of recirculation pumps. Lack of power caused problems in cooling the 
core. 
 
Bertini et. al.1980 
 
 
13/3/80 
 
Saint-Laurent A NPP, 
France 
 
A metal plate blocked the flow of gas coolant through six channels, 
causing the fuel elements in these channels to melt. 
 
Saur 1996 
 
10/82 
 
Armyanskaya NPP, 
USSR 
 
An explosion in a generator resulted in a fire which burned down the 
turbine hall. The core was undamaged. 
 
Medvedev 1989 
 
23/9/83 
 
RA-2, Argentina 
critical assembly 
 
To save time the lone operator bypassed the safety system while 
changing the core configuration. A power excursion occurred which 
killed the operator, but the core was undamaged. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
28/2/85 
 
Virgil C. Summer NPP, 
S.Carolina 
 
The reactor became critical too soon, resulting in a power surge. There 
was no contamination off site. 
 
Medvedev 1989 
 
27/6/85 
 
Balakovo NPP, USSR 
 
During start-up a relief valve burst filling a room where people were 
working with steam at 300 C. 14 people were killed. 
 
Medvedev 1989 
55 
 
 
1/5/86 
 
Agricultural and 
Mechanical University, 
Texas 
 
An experimental device with negative activity was withdrawn from the 
reactor resulting in a power spike. No damage occurred. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
12/1/87 
 
Saint-Laurent A NPP, 
France 
 
Large chunks of ice blocked the water inlet for the secondary coolant. 
This caused the condensers for the heat exchangers to over pressurize 
and caused the reactor to automatically shut down. 
 
Leblond 1996 
 
29/2/88 
 
North Carolina State 
University, USA 
 
A leak in the primary coolant system kept the reactor shut down, 
release limits were not exceeded. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
10/10/88 
 
EWA, Poland 
research reactor 
 
A fuel element was dropped and broke. About 2x109 Bq of 
radioactive material entered the reactor pool, there was no exposure to 
personnel. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
11/11/89 
 
TRIGA research reactor, 
Pitesti, Romania 
 
During fuel shuffling two fuel assemblies were placed in free positions 
beyond the reach of the control rods. The reactor became critical for 
about 2 minutes. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
20/3/90 
 
Vogtle 1 NPP 
 
While shut down for refuelling and routine maintenance a vehicle 
accident resulted in the loss of offsite AC power. Problems with the 
buck-up power supply resulted in a loss of shutdown cooling. 
Emergency power was restored before the core overheated. 
 
Manning 1991 
 
1991 
 
Forbach 
 
Two operators seriously irradiated at an electron accelerator. 
 
Pasquier 1996 
 
9/2/91 
 
Mihana 2, Japan 
 
The primary cooling circuit was breached when a tube ruptured in a 
steam generator. 
 
Sandon 1996 
 
5/4/91 
 
High Flux Reactor, 
Grenoble, France 
 
During routine inspection cracks in a water flow distributor were 
noticed. The component was replaced. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
7/5/91 
 
University of 
Massachusetts 
 
The reactor was operated for 16 minutes with a basket, to prevent 
bypass flow around fuel elements, removed in violation of technical 
specifications. The reactor was shut down when the condition became 
known. No damage was done.  
 
IAEA 1994 
 
8/6/92 
 
Ford Research Nuclear 
Reactor, Michigan, 
USA 
 
A fuel element was removed while the reactor was critical, causing the 
reactor to shut down. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
13/11/92 
 
Iowa State University, 
USA 
 
During a scram as part of an experiment it was noted that the shim rod 
had not fully inserted. The reactor shut down without it. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
5/3/93 
 
Ohio State University, 
USA 
 
During normal shutdown it was noted that one of the safety rods failed 
to insert, due to a short circuit. The reactor shut down without it.  
 
IAEA 1994 
 
24/3/93 
 
Ford Research Nuclear 
Reactor, Michigan, 
USA 
 
The licensed power limit was exceed by 15% for about 11 minutes. 
This violated procedure, but the power level was well within the safety 
limit of the reactor, and below the automatic scram point. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
28/4/93 
 
University of Virginia, 
USA 
 
The reactor was operated for about 5 hours with several scram systems 
inoperable, the problem was discovered at the end of the day when a 
period scram did not occur. 
 
IAEA 1994 
 
4/1/94 
 
McMaster Nuclear 
Research Reactor, 
Ontario, Canada  
 
During refuelling safety rods were withdrawn to 85% rather than the 
required 40%. On insertion of the sixth fuel assembly a blue glow was 
seen and the reactor tripped. There was no release of radioactive 
materials. 
 
 
 
Dec 1995 
 
Monju prototype fast 
breeder reactor, Japan 
 
Liquid sodium coolant leaking from pipes almost melted through the 
steel floor. This could have resulted in an explosive reaction between 
the sodium and concrete, which contains over 50% water. 
 
 
 
 
